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Abstract
Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography and an empirically plausible descrip-
tion of city systems. This paper provides a rationale for central place theory via a dynamic programming 
formulation of the social planner’s problem of city hierarchy. We show that there must be one and only 
one immediate smaller city between two neighboring larger-sized cities in any optimal solution. If the fixed 
cost of setting up a city is a power function, then the immediate smaller city will be located in the middle, 
confirming the locational pattern suggested by Christaller [4]. We also show that the solution can be approx-
imated by iterating the mapping defined by the dynamic programming problem. The main characterization 
results apply to a general hierarchical problem with recursive divisions.
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1. Introduction
Central place theory describes how a city hierarchy is formed from a featureless plain of farm-
ers as consumers. It is a key building block of economic geography (King [17]) and dates back 
at least to Christaller [4]. Many have argued for its empirical plausibility as a description of city 
hierarchy (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables [11], Berliant [3], Mori, Nishikimi, and Smith [22], 
Mori and Smith [23]). Although original central place theory is not a rigorous economic theory 
based on incentives and equilibrium, many economists have found its insights appealing, and a 
few attempts have been made to formalize it, including those by Eaton and Lipsey [8], Quinzii 
and Thisse [25], Fujita, Krugman, and Mori [10], Tabuchi and Thisse [31], and Hsu [16].1
The basic idea behind this theory is that goods differ in their degree of scale economies relative 
to market size. Goods for which this ratio is large, e.g., stock exchanges or symphony orchestras, 
will be found in only a few places, whereas goods for which the ratio is small, e.g., gas stations 
or convenience stores, will be found in many places. Moreover, large cities tend to have a wide 
range of goods, whereas small cities provide only goods with low scale economies. Naturally, 
small cities are in the market areas of large cities for those goods that they themselves do not 
provide. In Christaller’s scheme, the hierarchy property2 holds if larger cities provide all of the 
goods that smaller cities also provide and more.
In this paper, a city system is composed of multiple layers of cities, and cities of the same layer 
have the same functions, i.e., they host the same set of industries. The driving force behind the 
differentiation of cities is the heterogeneity of scale economies among goods, which is modeled 
by heterogeneity in the setup costs of production. In addition to the hierarchy property, another 
defining feature of city hierarchy in central place theory, that is called the central place property, 
is that there is only one next-layer city between neighboring larger cities and it is halfway in 
between. Christaller [4] calls this the K = 3 market principle.3 The city hierarchy described 
by central place theory (hereafter central place hierarchy) is a city system in which both the 
hierarchy and central place properties hold. Fig. 1 provides an illustration of such a city hierarchy 
in a one-dimensional geographic space.4
This paper takes aim at providing a rationale for central place theory via a social planner’s 
problem. An innovative feature of this paper is that the social planner’s problem is formulated 
1 Besides central place theory, another important theory of city hierarchy is Henderson’s [13] type-of-cities theory, 
which emphasizes cities’ roles in industrial specialization. Also see the extension to city growth by Rossi-Hansberg and 
Wright [26].
2 This is often called the hierarchy principle in the literature.
3 On the plane, if there is always only one next-layer city located at the centroid of the equilateral triangle area in 
between three neighboring larger cities, then the ratio of the market areas is 3.
4 The vertical axis shows the range of goods produced and goods are indexed by some measure of the degree of scale 
economies, e.g., fixed cost of production, y ∈ [0, ¯y], for some y¯ > 0. The hierarchy property implies that each city 
provides goods in [0, y] for some y. Hence, a layer-i city provides goods in [0, yi ], and obviously, y1 = y¯.
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Fig. 1. Central place hierarchy on the line.
as a dynamic programming problem in a geographic space (instead of in time). In this paper, we 
ask what optimal city hierarchy would arise from a uniformly populated space via the tradeoff 
between transport costs and the setup costs of production (and hence, the setup costs of cities). 
Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [19] pioneer the application of dynamic programming to a spatial 
problem.5 Whereas they study city residents’ choice of work and residence locations within a 
city, we apply the technique to a spatial problem of city locations. Earlier literature in regional 
science also addresses central place theory using a recursive structure, e.g., Beckmann [1,2], but 
does not make use of dynamic programming.
Quinzii and Thisse [25] also ask how a central place hierarchy might emerge from a socially 
optimal solution, and while they provide conditions under which the hierarchy property emerges 
in the optimal solution, their optimal solution does not feature the central place property. In 
contrast, this paper takes as given the hierarchy property and asks instead whether the spacing in 
central place theory is optimal. In addition to Quinzii and Thisse [25], the other above-mentioned 
attempts at modeling central place theory, with the exception of Hsu [16], have mostly ignored 
the locational issue, i.e., focused on the hierarchy property. Thus, this paper complements the 
literature by squarely confronting the locational issue. As we will clarify, the hierarchical loca-
tion choice problem is more complex than one would have imagined or hoped, even with the 
assumption of uniform distribution.
In this model there are a continuum of goods that varies in setup cost of production and a 
continuum of locations containing individuals who need to consume all the different goods. This 
underlying modeling structure is the same as that used in Hsu [16]. In both papers, the central 
issue is what structure of cities will emerge in this economy, but the formulations of the prob-
lem are very different. Hsu [16] focuses on the market equilibrium outcome. This paper instead 
solves the social planner’s problem. The social planner’s problem is more technically challeng-
ing than the market equilibrium outcome, requiring us to approach the problem in a different 
way. In particular, to verify equilibrium in Hsu [16], it was sufficient to examine local conditions 
in which marginal firms had zero profit. Here, we need to tackle the global optimality of the 
planner’s solution, and this leads to the development of our dynamic programming approach, an 
approach that may have additional applications, as we discuss below. In addition to the difference
5 Broadly speaking, spatial problems, like time problems, are closely associated with recursivity and often have to make 
use of some functional approaches. For example, see Mirrlees [21], who probes the properties of an optimal population 
density function in a monocentric city.
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in formulations, the two papers focus on different questions. Here, the main focus is on whether 
or not the central place property is satisfied. In Hsu [16], the central place property is a simple re-
sult, and his focus is whether equilibrium city size distribution follows the power law. We further 
elaborate on the connections between these papers in Section 4.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that under rather weak conditions on the 
structure of setup costs, there will always be one and only one immediate sub-city, i.e., the largest 
among all cities in between two neighboring larger-sized cities. The intuition for why there is at 
least one city is straightforward, and we provide it here. We assume that the setup cost goes to 
zero as city size goes to zero. Thus, between any pair of cities it is always worthwhile to place 
another city, perhaps one that is very small, to save on the transport costs generated by consumers 
buying low setup cost goods. The intuition of why there is only one intermediate sub-city is more 
complicated, and we defer this to later.
Second, based on the first result, we formulate a sequence problem and the corresponding 
dynamic programming problem while providing characterization for both problems. To find an 
optimal hierarchy, the social planner’s problem can be formulated as looking for a sequence of 
the locations and sizes of immediate sub-cities to minimize the per capita cost. When the size 
and location of an immediate sub-city are chosen, the location divides the area bounded by the 
two neighboring larger-sized cities into two areas, each of which is a new area in which a new 
sub-city is to be determined. Thus, the sequence problem form of the social planner’s problem 
involves an infinite bifurcation of areas. Such recursivity naturally allows a dynamic program-
ming formulation. We show that the two problems are equivalent (the principle of optimality). 
More importantly, for the mapping defined by the dynamic programming problem, we show that 
there exists a unique fixed point and it equals the minimized cost function of the sequence prob-
lem, and that the fixed point can be approximated by iterations of the mapping, even though the 
mapping is not necessarily a contraction as there is no discount factor. Our numerical examples 
show that the iterations converge to the solution at a rather fast rate.
We find that all of these characterization results apply to a general problem of recursive di-
visions and are hence potentially useful in various hierarchical problems. For example, there is 
a large literature on firm hierarchy, e.g., Qian [24], Garicano [14], and Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg [15], and the techniques developed in this paper can potentially contribute to this 
literature. Other possible venues of application include outsourcing in trade and the structure 
of fiscal decentralization. We present the results on the general problem first and then show how 
these results apply to the city hierarchy problem.
Third, we find an interesting case in which we can find the unique fixed point analytically. 
We show that when the setup cost function is a power, the central place property holds, i.e., the 
optimal location of any immediate sub-city is exactly in the middle between two neighboring 
larger-sized cities. This functional form is of particular interest because Hsu [16] showed that 
under this condition, the resulting equilibrium size distribution of cities follows a power law, 
a well-known empirical regularity.6
6 Deviations from the power law may be found when smaller cities or towns are included (Eeckhout [9]), but the power 
law remains a good approximation at least for the right tail (Eeckhout [9], Rozenfeld, Rybski, Gabaix, and Makse [27]). 
The model in this paper is also consistent with such deviations. See further discussion in Section 3.4. Unlike other 
theories of urban systems and city size distribution, Hsu’s explanation of city size distribution is based on what cities do 
differently and how things occur geographically, rather than on a random growth process of cities. For explanations along 
this line, see Simon [29], Gabaix [12], Eeckhout [9], Duranton [6,7], Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [26], and Córdoba [5].
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Fourth, we determine when the social planner’s solution coincides with the market equilib-
rium outcome in Hsu [16]. In particular, we show that the optimal solution can be achieved 
through the equilibrium outcome; that is, the optimal solution can be decentralized. However, 
other suboptimal equilibria also exist.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the environment, defines 
the social planner’s problem, and derives two key lemmas that simplify the problem. Section 3
formulates both the sequence and dynamic programming problems and provides characterization 
results for both the city hierarchy problem and a more general problem. It also shows that the 
central place property holds under the power law distribution of setup costs. Section 4 compares 
the optimal allocation with Hsu’s [16] equilibrium. This section also briefly discusses the prob-
lem in two-dimensional space. Section 5 gives our conclusions. Several proofs are relegated to a 
separate appendix which is available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.018.
2. Model and immediate sub-cities
2.1. Environment
The geographic space is the real line R on which an infinite mass of consumers is uniformly 
distributed with a density of one. There is a continuum of commodities labeled y ∈ [0, z1], where 
z1 is exogenously given. Each consumer demands one unit of each y ∈ [0, z1]. To produce any 
good y, a setup cost φ(y) is required. This setup cost includes the setup/fixed cost of producing 
y and any potential city-wide (fixed) external cost of producing y. The marginal cost is a con-
stant γ . To transport any good requires a cost of t per unit of distance. The goods are ranked in 
terms of their setup costs, and we assume that no two goods have the same setup cost. Hence, φ is 
strictly increasing. We also assume that φ is continuous with φ(0) = 0. In addition, we assume 
the hierarchy property: at any location, if a good z ≤ z1 is produced, then all y ∈ [0, z] are also 
produced.
We interpret production locations as cities. Without the hierarchy property, the optimal dis-
tance between two production locations can actually be solved good by good, and industries 
would not have to co-agglomerate at an optimal solution. Obviously, there are benefits to indus-
tries co-agglomerating, but we make those benefits implicit by assuming the hierarchy property 
so as to focus on the hierarchical location choice problem. To provide microfoundations for the 
hierarchy property per se is a rather challenging and worthwhile research agenda. For such an ef-
fort, see Eaton and Lipsey [8], Quinzii and Thisse [25], Fujita, Krugman, and Mori [10], Tabuchi 
and Thisse [30,31], and Hsu [16].
We assume a uniform distribution of consumers for tractability. However, one can also think 
of them as farmers who would locate themselves uniformly if agricultural productivity, or other 
instances of the on-site extraction of natural resources, were uniform and if the farming tech-
nology were Leontief in land and labor. The original development of central place theory per 
Christaller was in fact an attempt to explain the “industrial activities” that serve the farmers (on 
the farming plains of southern Germany). Nonetheless, it is important to note that it does not 
actually matter whether agricultural employment is large or small; as long as there are immobile 
consumers spreading across the entire geographic space, there exists the need for cities and towns 
to spread out to serve these consumers.
2.2. The problem
We label a location that produces all goods up to z as a z-city. Denote the cost of setting up 
a z-city as Φ(z) ≡ ∫ z0 φ(y)dy. According to the hierarchy property, z also refers to a city’s size.
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The social planner’s objective is to decide the locations and sizes of cities to minimize the per 
capita cost of production to serve every consumer a unit of each good in [0, z1].
A z1-city serves the entire possible range of goods. Since all goods must be consumed, in-
cluding z1 with the highest setup costs, z1-cities must exist in any social planning solution. The 
first question then facing the social planner is how far apart z1-cities should be spaced on the 
real line. We denote the distance between two z1-cities as 1 and call all of the cities in between 
two neighboring z1-cities a city hierarchy, which for now includes the possibility of no smaller 
cities. Without loss of generality, let the area/interval between a particular pair of neighboring
z1-cities be [0, 1], i.e., the two cities are located at 0 and 1, respectively. Because consumers 
must be served by the nearest production locations, no consumers on [0, 1] will be served by the 
cities outside [0, 1]. Thus, to search for a solution, the social planner looks for an 1 and a city 
hierarchy on (0, 1) without information on the city hierarchies outside this interval. However, if 
there is an optimal 1 and an optimal city hierarchy on (0, 1), this optimal city hierarchy can be 
duplicated on (k1, (k + 1)1), k ∈ Z with two neighboring intervals sharing a common z1-city 
at the border. Hence, it is always optimal to evenly space z1-cities, although uneven spacing of 
z1-cities may also be optimal if there are multiple solutions of 1. In sum, the social planner’s 
problem involves two stages. In the first stage, the social planner decides 1. In the second stage, 
the social planner determines the city hierarchy given 1. The focus of our analysis is the second 
stage, which spans Sections 2 and 3. The optimal choice of 1 is analyzed in Section 3.5.
Given 1, let the discrete set of cities on (0, 1) be denoted as
W ≡
{
(zi,Lzi , I ) | zi ∈ (0, z1], i = 1,2, ..., I, I ∈N∪ {∞}, zi > zi+1,
Lzi is the set of locations of zi-cities
}
.
That is, zi is the i-th largest among all cities on (0, 1). For now, there may be multiple zi cities, 
and Lzi and |Lzi | denote the set of locations and the number of zi-cities on (0, 1), respectively. 
The number I is the number of layers of cities, and I can be (countably) infinite.
The optimization problem, given 1, is to search for a city hierarchy W that solves
C∗(1, z1) ≡ inf
W
1
1
[∑
zi
|Lzi |Φ(zi)+ total transport cost
]
. (1)
Three points are worth noting. First, we ignore the per capita variable cost because it is al-
ways γ z1, regardless of the allocation W . Second, “total transport cost” is calculated as fol-
lows. Since each city hierarchy W defines a partition of market areas on (0, 1) for each good 
y ∈ [0, z1],7 the transport cost for each y is thus the sum of transport costs incurred in each mar-
ket area. We obtain the “total transport cost” by integrating over y. The concept is clear, but the 
expression is messy and not helpful for the following analysis. Hence, we do not include this 
notational burden. Third, we write inf instead of min in (1) because the existence of a minimizer 
is not yet proven. An infimum obviously exists because the objective is bounded between zero 
and the cost of building no city hierarchy on the interval of length 1.
2.3. Two key lemmas
The following two lemmas provide key characteristics of an optimal hierarchy that enables us 
to set up the planner’s problem as a dynamic programming problem.
7 Here, although there are no markets, we use the market area of a production location to refer to the interval in which 
the consumers are served by the location.
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Fig. 2. A suboptimal situation: Two cities of the same size z′ without a larger city in between them. City k’s location and 
market area are denoted as wk and mk , respectively, for k ∈ {A, B}.
Lemma 1. It is never optimal to have an interval without any city in it.
Proof. Consider an interval [0, ] such that there are no cities in (0, ) in between two cities 
located at 0 and , respectively. Let z denote the size of the smaller of the two cities at the end 
points. Now, consider adding a z′-city in the middle in between with z′ ≤ z. Then, the savings 
in transport cost per good is 2 
∫ /2
0 txdx − 4 
∫ /4
0 txdx = t2/8. Accounting for the increase in 
setup cost, the net saving from having a z′-city is given by S(z′; ) ≡ ∫ z′0 [ t28 −φ(y)]dy. Because 
φ is continuous and strictly increasing, and φ(0) = 0, S(z′; ) > 0 for sufficiently small z′ > 0, 
given . The result follows from the fact that there always exists sufficiently small z′ such that 
adding a z′-city improves the allocation. 
Two direct consequences of Lemma 1 are that the number of layers I is countably infinite 
and there are countably infinitely many cities between any two cities. It is also straightforward 
that if φ(0) > 0, such a proof breaks down for two cities sufficiently close to each other, i.e., 
is sufficiently small. Thus, when φ(0) > 0, the number of cities in an optimal city hierarchy is 
necessarily finite.
Lemma 2. It is never optimal to have two cities of the same size z′ < z1 without a larger city in 
between.
Proof. Suppose that in an optimal allocation there are two cities of the same size z′ without 
a larger city in between them. Without loss of generality, let the two z′-cities be placed in an 
interval (0, ) and two cities whose sizes are larger than z′ be placed at the endpoints, i.e., 0 and . 
Call the two z′-cities A and B , and denote their locations as wA and wB , respectively. See Fig. 2
for an illustration. When simultaneously increasing z′ at the two z′-cities infinitesimally, there 
are savings in transport costs because some consumers are closer to z′-cities than to the endpoint 
cities. Let mk , k ∈ {A, B} be the interval in which consumers find that city k is the nearest place 
to buy z′, and denote the savings in transport costs due to consumers in mk switching as s˜1k . 
Note that the optimality of z′ requires that 
∑
k s˜
1
k = 2φ(z′) because the total savings in transport 
cost from simultaneously increasing z′ infinitesimally should equal the total setup cost of z′. 
Now, denote the savings in transport cost when increasing z′ infinitesimally only at city k as s1k . 
Observe that s1k consists of two parts. The first part is the savings experienced by the consumers 
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in mk , which equal s˜1k . The second part exists because a positive measure of consumers outside 
mk and in mk′ , k′ 	= k, also find city k closer than either of the endpoint cities. Hence, s1k > s˜1k , 
and 
∑
k s
1
k >
∑
k s˜
1
k = 2φ(z′). This implies that s1k > φ(z′) for at least one k, which, in turn, 
implies that the allocation can be improved by increasing z′ at this k. The result follows. 
The key insight is that there is a point in between two z′-cities at which consumers find 
both of the z′-cities closer than either of the endpoint cities, and when z′ increases at either of 
the z′-cities separately, the consumers around this point benefit either way. Hence, the sum of 
benefits of increasing the range of goods at each city separately is larger than the benefits of 
increasing the ranges of goods in both cities simultaneously, the latter of which should equal the 
total setup cost of z′, 2φ(z′), if having two z′-cities is optimal. This implies that for at least one 
city, the benefits of increasing the range at this city individually is larger than φ(z′), and we must 
strictly prefer to increase the range at this city. However, this contradicts the assumption that it is 
optimal to have two z′-cities.
Note that neither Lemma 1 or 2 depends on the assumption that consumers are uniformly 
distributed. Now, consider the process of building a city hierarchy in between two z1-cities. 
Lemma 1 states that having no cities in between is not optimal. Let z2 denote the size of the 
largest cities in between two z1-cities. Then, Lemma 2 implies that there can be only one z2-city 
in an optimal solution. From the perspective of the two z1-cities, z2-city is the immediate sub-city. 
Similarly, in between a z2-city and a z1-city, there is one and only one immediate sub-city, and 
this process goes on recursively. This process following the two lemmas entails a simplified 
problem, which we study in Section 3.
Lemma 2 provides a partial rationale for the central place property, as there is “one” imme-
diate sub-city. If the immediate sub-city is always located in the middle, then the spacing will 
conform to the central place property. However, this is not necessarily the case, as we subse-
quently explain.
2.4. An immediate sub-city is not necessarily in the middle
As two cities having the same size z′ without a larger city in between, as illustrated in Fig. 2, 
cannot be optimal, suppose that city B has larger size z′′ > z′ and city A remains at z′. Consider 
the benefits of moving city B closer to the center. Although this increases savings in transport 
costs for goods in (z′, z′′] because they are more centered, it also moves goods [0, z′] toward 
the center and increases the average transport costs for people buying at city B . If there were 
no hierarchy property, the social planner would split goods and move good (z′, z′′] to the center 
and keep [0, z′] at A and B . However, the hierarchy property places a constraint. Hence, what 
is actually optimal depends on the distribution of setup costs. In the following, we provide an 
example in which the immediate sub-city is not in the middle in the optimal solution.
Let t = z1 = 1 = 1. Consider a discontinuous setup cost requirement function: for an arbitrar-
ily small e ∈ (0, 1), φ(y) = 1/13 for y ∈ [0, e] and φ(y) = 1 for y ∈ (e, 1]. It is readily verified 
that, in between two z1-cities, the per capita cost is minimized by evenly placing two immediate 
sub-cities with z′ = e.8 Note that the above lemmas do not have to hold here because φ is not 
8 To see this, first note that savings in transport costs per good from having n ≥ 1 cities is bounded above by the savings 
when placing these n cities evenly, which equals t
2
1
4 × nn+1 and increases in n. The savings in transport costs of having 
two evenly-spaced e-cities is then 1/6 per good and is larger than the setup costs incurred, 2/13. Obviously, it is not 
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Fig. 3. Illustration of sequence problem.
smooth and φ(0) > 0. Now, take a smooth approximation of φ (with φ being continuous, strictly 
increasing, and φ(0) = 0). The solution must be close to the previous solution, but by Lemma 2, 
there is just one immediate sub-city. Therefore, the solution must be two sub-cities near 1/3 and 
2/3 with the range of production of one city being slightly larger than the other. In particular, 
the immediate sub-city is not half-way in between the two z1-cities. This example illustrates the 
possibilities of uneven spacing of cities. The intuition will be clear in our comparison between 
this example and the central place property result in Proposition 5.
3. Dynamic programming and the central place property
3.1. The sequence and dynamic programming problems
3.1.1. The sequence problem
Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that in between two z1-cities it is optimal to place one and only one 
immediate sub-city, which is denoted as a z2-city. The location of the z2-city divides the interval 
of length 1 into two parts. Let 2,1 and 2,2 be the distances from the z2-city to the z1-city on 
the left and right side, respectively. When the values of z2, 2,1 and 2,2 are chosen, the recursive 
nature of the problem becomes apparent because the cost calculations for the goods in (z2, z1]
become irrelevant to decisions regarding the size and location of the immediate sub-city in each 
of the two intervals of length 2,1 and 2,2. That is, the cost minimization problem given z2 and 
2,1 and that given z2 and 2,2 take the same form as the one given z1 and 1.
The two lemmas imply that the city building process, viewed from the top down, involves 
endless bifurcations. Fig. 3 depicts the result from the first three rounds of bifurcations. To write 
the problem in sequence form, we must develop our notation carefully. As previously mentioned, 
given 1 and z1, the first round of bifurcation involves choosing a z2-city, the location of which di-
vides the interval of length 1 into intervals of length 2,1 and 2,2. Then, given z2, 2,1, and 2,2, 
the second round of bifurcation involves choosing a z3,1-city and a z3,2-city in the intervals of 
desirable to have more than two e-cities. With φ(y) being a constant for all y ∈ [0, e], there are no more cities on (0, 1)
besides these e-cities. For y ∈ (e, 1], since φ(y) = 1 > t
2
1
4 >
t21
4 × nn+1 , increasing z′ from e does not reduce the per 
capita cost.
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length 2,1 and 2,2, respectively. The interval of 2,1 is further divided into 3,1 and 3,2, and 
the interval of 2,2 is further divided into 3,3 and 3,4. In general, the i-th round of bifurcation 
involves setting up cities of sizes zi+1,1, zi+1,2, ..., zi+1,Ki , where Ki = 2i−1, which divides in-
tervals of length i,1, i,2, ..., i,Ki , respectively. Formally, let z1 ≡ {z1}, and for all i ∈ N, let 
i ≡ {i,k}Kik=1 and zi+1 ≡ {zi+1,k}Kik=1, where 1,1 ≡ 1 and z2,1 ≡ z2. We define
Γ1(1, z1) ≡ Γ (1, z1)
≡ {(2,z2) ∣∣ z2 ∈ [0, z1], 2,1, 2,2 ∈ (0, 1) and 2,1 + 2,2 = 1} (2)
and for i ≥ 2,
Γi(i ,zi ) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(i+1,zi+1)|zi+1,2k−1, zi+1,2k ∈ [0, zi,k],
for all k = 1,2, ...,Ki−1,
i+1,2k−1, i+1,2k ∈ (0, i,k) and i+1,2k−1 + i+1,2k = i,k,
for all k = 1,2, ...,Ki.
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
Then, define
Π(1, z1) ≡
{
(i ,zi )
∞
i=1
∣∣ (i+1,zi+1) ∈ Γi(i ,zi ), for all i = 1,2, ...}.
Any (, z) ≡ (i , zi )∞i=1 ∈ Π(1, z1) is called a feasible sequence, given (1, z1).
For an immediate sub-city, z′-city, in between two neighboring larger-sized cities, let  be the 
distance between the two neighboring larger-sized cities, and let the z′-city’s distance to one of 
the two cities be α, for α ∈ (0, 1). The savings in transport costs for each good in [0, z′] is
s1(,α) ≡ 2

2∫
0
txdx −
(
2
α
2∫
0
txdx + 2
(1−α)
2∫
0
txdx
)
= t
2
2
α(1 − α). (3)
Then, the optimal magnitude of z′ is determined by
s1(,α) = t
2
2
α(1 − α) = φ(z′). (4)
The left-hand side of (4) is the savings in transport costs when increasing z′ marginally, whereas 
the right-hand side is the corresponding setup cost. If z′ is low such that φ(z′) < t22 α(1 − α), 
it incurs positive net savings (savings in transport costs net of setup costs) by increasing z′. 
Similarly, when φ(z′) > t22 α(1 − α), one can improve the allocation by decreasing z′. In sum, 
Lemmas 1 and 2 and (4) imply that in any optimal city hierarchy the following constraint holds:⎧⎨
⎩
zi+1,2k−1, zi+1,2k ∈ (0, zi,k)
i+1,2k−1, i+1,2k ∈ (0, i,k), i+1,2k−1 + i+1,2k = i,k
zi+1,k = φ−1( t2i+1,2k−1i+1,2k)
⎫⎬
⎭ . (5)
Equivalently, any optimal city hierarchy is associated with a sequence α = {αi,k} such that 
i+1,2k−1 = αi,ki,k (hence i+1,2k = (1 − αi,k)i,k) and (5) holds.
Note that in defining the choice set of (, z) ≡ (i , zi )∞i=1 by Γi and Π above, we leave (4)
implicit and take the closure of (0, zi,k). According to Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that situations 
in which zi+1,2k−1 or zi+1,2k equals 0 or zi,k are never optimal (except possibly for i = 1), 
but we do not lose any generality by including this possibility. When the choice of zi+1,2k−1, 
according to (4) and given i,2k−1, is such that zi+1,2k−1 > zi,k , one can always relabel i, k to 
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ensure that the constraint zi+1,2k−1, zi+1,2k ∈ [0, zi,k] is obeyed.9 Thus, the choice set defined 
by Π encompasses all possible candidates for an optimal city hierarchy. In other words, any 
sequence (, z) that satisfies all constraints in (5) is included in Π(1, z1). If one would like to 
make the constraint (4) explicit, one could redefine Γi by replacing zi+1,2k−1, zi+1,2k ∈ [0, zi,k]
with
zi+1,2k−1 = min
{
φ−1
(
t
2
i+1,4k−1i+1,4k−2
)
, zi,k
}
,
zi+1,2k = min
{
φ−1
(
t
2
i+1,4k−3i+1,4k−4
)
, zi,k
}
.
Suppose the social planner has two z-cities with distance  and nothing in between them. The 
total cost in this interval of  is
A(, z) ≡ Φ(z)+ zt
2
4
.
Note that only one setup cost of a z-city is counted in this definition. When a z′-city divides an 
interval of  bounded by two cities producing at least up to z, the total cost for the range of goods 
(z′, z] is given by A(, z) −A(, z′) = Φ(z) −Φ(z′) + (z− z′)t2/4. We can view the per capita 
cost for the goods [0, z1] on 1 as the sum of the per capita cost of different ranges of goods on 
different market areas within 1. Namely, the sequence problem is
C∗(1, z1)
≡ inf
(,z)∈Π(1,z1),
z1>0 given.
1
1
⎡
⎣A(1, z1)−A(1, z2)+∑∞i=2∑Ki−1k=1
[
A(i,2k−1, zi,k)−A(i,2k−1, zi+1,2k−1)
+A(i,2k, zi,k)−A(i,2k, zi+1,2k)
] ⎤⎦ .
(SP)
Let us examine (SP) with reference to Fig. 3. Suppose in the definition of (SP), for any 
A(i,2k−1, zi,k) −A(i,2k−1, zi+1,2k−1) (or, A(i,2k, zi,k) −A(i,2k, zi+1,2k)), we count the setup 
costs incurred at the city on the left end, but not those at the city on the right-end. Then one sees 
that (SP) includes all of the setup costs incurred on [0, 1), leaving out the setup costs at 1. Of 
course, the city at 1 is the left-end city of another interval, and hence we do not miss any setup 
cost over the entire space. Solving (SP) gives the infimum of the per capita cost on the half-open 
interval of length 1.
Denote the objective function in (SP) as f (, z) = limn→∞ fn(, z), where fn(, z) is the 
objective function with ∞ replaced by n. Because the partial sum fn(, z) is bounded in 
[0, A(1, z1)/1] and nondecreasing in n, it converges for any given (, z) ∈ Π(1, z1). As the 
value of the objective is bounded in [0, A(1, z1)/1], C∗ is uniquely defined with C∗(1, z1) ∈
[0, A(1, z1)/1] for all (1, z1).
9 We allow zi+1,2k−1 = zi,k (or, zi+1,2k = zi,k ) as a choice to keep the choice set of αi,2k−1 (or, αi,2k ) a connected 
interval. To see this, imagine that we are given i,2k−1 and zi,k , and we have to choose an αi,2k−1 and zi+1,2k−1. 
Suppose we want to choose αi,2k−1 = 1/2, but according to (4), this can give a zi+1,2k−1 ≥ zi,k if i,2k−1 is very large. 
We know that zi+1,2k−1 > zi,k is not optimal, but we can relabel things in this case. We also know that zi+1,2k−1 = zi,k
is not optimal, but if we do not even allow this, then there is a neighborhood of 1/2 that we cannot choose for αi,2k−1.
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3.1.2. The dynamic programming problem
Given state variables  and z, the social planner needs to decide the size and location of the 
immediate sub-city, z′-city. Denote the length of the intervals to the left/right of z′-city as l/r . 
Then, l + r = . Alternatively, let l = α and r = (1 − α) for α ∈ (0, 1). We present the 
following dynamic programming problem
C(, z) = inf
l ,r∈(0,),l+r=,z′∈[0,z]
1

[
A(, z)−A(, z′)+ lC(l, z′)+ rC(r , z′)]
= inf
α∈(0,1),z′∈[0,z]
1

[
A(, z)−A(, z′)]+ αC(α, z′)+ (1 − α)C((1 − α), z′).
(DP)
The solution to the above problem is a cost function C and policy functions z′ = gz(, z) and 
α = gα(, z), which entail the next state variables for each side of the division, given current 
(, z): (l, z
′) = (gα(, z), gz(, z)) and (r , z′) = ((1 −gα(, z)), gz(, z)). The problem (DP)
is much more compact than the sequence problem (SP), as the recursive nature allows the terms 
αC(α, z′) and (1 − α)C((1 − α), z′) to subsume the per capita cost for all goods in [0, z′] on 
the intervals of length α and (1 − α), respectively.
Note that the two sub-problems, C(α, z′) and C((1 − α), z′), share the same top good z′. 
This is again due to Lemmas 1 and 2; that is, the social planner chooses one and only one 
immediate sub-city. Once z′ is determined, the per capita cost for the set of goods (z′, z] is also 
determined, and therefore in both sub-problems, the social planner no longer needs to take into 
account goods that are higher than z′. This is clearly seen in Fig. 3 by taking  = 1, z = z1, and 
z′ = z2.
3.1.3. Total rather than per capita cost
It is often useful to look at a transformation of (SP) and (DP) by letting D∗(1, z1) =
1C∗(1, z1), and D(, z) = C(, z):
D∗(1, z1)
= inf
(,z)∈Π(1,z1),
z1>0 given.
⎡
⎣A(1, z1)−A(1, z2)+∑∞i=2∑Ki−1k=1
[
A(i,2k−1, zi,k)−A(i,2k−1, zi+1,2k−1)
+A(i,2k, zi,k)−A(i,2k, zi+1,2k)
] ⎤⎦ ,
(SPD)
and
D(, z) = inf
α∈(0,1),z′∈[0,z]
A(, z)−A(, z′)+D(α, z′)+D((1 − α), z′). (DPD)
D∗ is the infimum of total cost, rather than per capita cost, for all of the goods [0, z1] on the 
interval of length 1. For any solution C to DP, D = C is a solution to (DPD), and vice versa.
3.2. Characterization theorems in a more general setting
As intuitive as it is, the equivalence between the sequence problem and its corresponding dy-
namic programming problem, i.e., the principle of optimality,10 requires a proof. This is because, 
for all we know so far, (DP) or, equivalently, (DPD), may have zero, one, or many solutions, and 
some kind of transversality condition is needed for a solution of (DP) to be the infimum function 
in (SP).
10 See Lucas and Stokey [20] for an exposition of the principle of optimality in a time sequence problem.
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As there is no discount factor in (DP) as in a typical time sequence problem, it is not obvious 
whether the mapping defined by (DP) is a contraction. Nevertheless, (DP) can still be character-
ized in a similar way to what is stated in a contraction mapping theorem. That is, the mapping 
defined by the right-hand side of (DP) is a self-mapping with C∗ as the unique fixed point. More-
over, this fixed point can be approximated by iterating the mapping. These results, along with the 
principle of optimality, apply to a more general setting with a recursive division structure. In this 
subsection, we show these results in a general setting, while in the next subsection we show how 
the conditions of these theorems are satisfied in the city hierarchy problem (SPD) and (DPD). 
The results of the original (SP) and (DP) then follow.
It is worth noting that these characterization results, especially the convergence theorem, are 
potentially useful in various settings involving recursive division, which often occurs in a hier-
archical structure. For example, it can be used to study a firm hierarchy in which a CEO would 
like to determine the best division of labor among different posts at different layers of the hier-
archy, which often invokes a recursive structure.11 Other possible venues for application include 
outsourcing in trade and the structure of fiscal decentralization.
3.2.1. A general setting with q-furcation and without discount factor
Consider a generalized setting in which the law of motion stipulates multi-furcation, or, 
q-furcation, where q is a positive integer. The city hierarchy problem is simply one in which 
q = 2. We first formulate a general sequence problem. Let X ⊆ RN denote the domain of state 
variables and Γ : X → Xq ⊆RqN be a nonempty correspondence. Let Ki = qi−1, i ∈N. For the 
i-th q-furcation, let index k = 1, 2, ..., qi−1 be grouped into qi−2 sets of indices such that for 
j = 1, 2, ..., qi−2,
kj = (j − 1)q + 1, (j − 1)q + 2, ..., jq.
That is, k1 = 1, 2, ..., q , k2 = q + 1, q + 2, ..., 2q , and so on. Denote xi,j ≡ {xi,kj }kj ∈RqN , and 
xi ≡ {xi,j }q
i−2
j=1 . For i ≥ 2, define
Γi(xi ) ≡
{
xi+1 ∈ Xqi ⊆RqiN
∣∣ xi+1,k ∈ Γ (xi,k) for k = 1,2, ...,Ki}. (6)
In words, Γi recursively defines the set of feasible xi+1,k qN -dimensional vectors, given an xi,k
N -dimensional vector. A sequence x = {xi}∞i=1 is feasible if it satisfies xi+1 ∈ Γi(xi ) ⊆Rq
iN for 
all i. Let the set of all feasible sequences starting with x1 ∈ X be denoted as Π(x1).
Let F be a real-valued function on RN ×RqN . The sequence problem is then defined as
V ∗(x1) ≡ inf
x∈Π(x1),
x1∈X given.
F (x1,x2)+
∞∑
i=2
Ki∑
k=1
F(xi,k,xi+1,k). (SPV )
The superscript V is reserved for the general sequence and dynamic programming problems. The 
corresponding dynamic programming problem is
V (x) ≡ inf
y∈Γ (x),
x∈X given.
F (x,y)+
q∑
k=1
V (yk). (DPD)
11 An interesting firm hierarchy problem is studied by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg [15], who show in their Appendix 1 
that the problem becomes recursive when the decision-making process is decentralized.
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We design the pattern of the notation such that the superscript ∗ indicates it is the optimum value 
of the sequence problem (C∗, D∗, and V ∗), whereas the capital letter without this superscript 
(C, D, and V ) indicates the solution to the corresponding dynamic programming problem.
This problem also applies to q = 1, and in this case, the sequence and dynamic programming 
problems are simply V ∗(x1) ≡ inf∑∞i=1 F(xi, xi+1), and V (x) ≡ inf[F(x, y) + V (y)].
3.2.2. Principle of optimality
The following two propositions establish the principle of optimality in the general setting. As 
both proofs follow steps similar to those in Lucas and Stokey [20, pp. 67–76], they are relegated 
to the separate appendix. The first concerns the equivalence between V ∗ and the solution V
to (DPD).
Proposition 1. (i) V ∗, the infimum function defined in the sequence problem (SPV), is a solution 
to the dynamic programming problem (DPD). (ii) If a function V is a solution to (DPD) and if
lim
i→∞
Ki∑
k=1
V (xi,k) = 0, (7)
then V = V ∗.
Proof. See the separate appendix. 
We offer a brief account of the proof of Proposition 1. Let un be the partial sum of the objective 
in (SPV ), i.e., the objective with n in place of ∞. Denote the objective in (SPV) as u(x) =
limn→∞ un(x). For all x ∈ Π(x1), let yk be the k-th part of the sequence starting from the second 
round of q-furcation. That is, yk ∈ Π(yk), where {yk}qk=1 ∈ Γ (x1). It is easily verified that for 
any x ∈ Π(x1),
u(x) = F(x,y)+
q∑
k=1
u(yk).
That is, for an arbitrary feasible sequence, the objective in (SPV) can be written in a recursive 
way, as in (DPD). The proof for V ∗ solving (DPD) therefore involves carefully showing why 
we can replace u with V ∗. In the reverse direction, we show in the separate appendix that, by 
induction, any V that satisfies (DPD) must satisfy
V (x1) ≤ inf
{xi }n+1i=1
[
F(x,x2)+
n∑
i=2
Ki∑
k=1
F(xi,k,xi+1,k)+
Kn+1∑
k=1
V (xn+1,k)
]
.
We thus need (7), i.e., the limit of the residual term is 0, so that V (x1) ≤ u(x) for all x ∈ Π(x1). 
The rest of the proof involves showing V (x1) + 	 ≥ u(x) for any 	 > 0 and some x ∈ Π(x1), and 
this residual term also appears.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 says that V ∗ is a solution to (DPD), and hence there is at least one 
solution to (DPD). Part (ii) says that any solution to (DPD) that satisfies (7) must be V ∗.
The second proposition concerns the equivalence between an optimal sequence in (SPV) and 
a sequence that satisfies the functional equation in (DPD) recursively.
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Proposition 2.
(i) If a feasible sequence x∗ ∈ Π(x1) attains the infimum in (SPV), then it satisfies
V ∗
(
x∗i,j
)= F (x∗i,j ,x∗i+1,j )+∑
kj
V ∗
(
x∗i+1,kj
)
. (8)
(ii) If a feasible sequence x∗ ∈ Π(x1) satisfies (8), and if it satisfies (7) with V ∗ in place of V , 
then it attains the infimum in (SPV).
Proof. See the separate appendix. 
If a feasible sequence attains the infimum in (SPV), i.e., a feasible sequence as a minimizer 
exists so that the infimum is indeed a minimum given by this sequence, then it also solves (DPD)
recursively with V = V ∗. The reverse is also true, provided that V ∗ satisfies (7). We have not yet 
proven the existence of such a sequence, but this will be addressed in the next proposition.
3.2.3. Dynamic programming mapping and the convergence of iterates
For any continuous, real-valued function v on X, let the mapping T be given by the right-hand 
side of (DPD), i.e.,
T v(x) ≡ inf
y∈Γ (x),
x∈X given.
F (x,y)+
q∑
k=1
v(yk). (9)
A fixed point of the mapping is a solution to (DPD), and vice versa. The first of the two fol-
lowing propositions connects the mapping T to both (DPD) and (SPV ), and the second shows that 
the sequence of iterates converges to V ∗, provided that the initial v is in certain space. Namely, 
denote the sequence of iterates of the mapping T as T n, then limn→∞ T nv = V ∗. Assume that 
the following hold:
A1. Γ is compact valued.
A2. For each x1 ∈ X and each feasible sequence x ∈Π(x1), limi→∞ xi,k = 0.
A3. F : X ×Xq →R+ is a continuous function with nonnegative values, and F(0) = 0.
Proposition 3. Suppose that A1, A2, and A3 hold. Also suppose that there exists a continuous and 
strictly increasing function M : X →R+ with M(0) = 0 such that if any continuous real-valued 
function v satisfies 0 ≤ v(x) ≤ M(x), then 0 ≤ T v(x) ≤ M(x). Denote the set of continuous 
functions v satisfying 0 ≤ v(x) ≤ M(x) as V(X). Then, the following hold:
(i) T v is continuous. Hence, T is a self-mapping on V(X).
(ii) The minimum is attained; so inf in the definition of T in (9) can be replaced with min. 
Moreover, the set of minimizers is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on X.
(iii) V ∗ is the unique solution to (DPD) in V(X) and hence the unique fixed point of the mapping 
T on V(X).
Proof. That the minimum is obtained follows directly from the facts that both F and v are con-
tinuous and that Γ (x) is compact for any x ∈ X. That T v is continuous and the set of minimizers 
given x ∈ X is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on X follows from the Theorem of the 
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Maximum (see Lucas and Stokey [20], p. 62). Since T v is continuous and 0 ≤ T v(x) ≤ M(x) for 
any continuous v such that 0 ≤ v(x) ≤ M(x), T is a self-mapping on V(X). Because M(0) = 0
and for all k, limi→∞ xi,k = 0, any v ∈ V(X) satisfies (7) with v in place of V . Then, according 
to Proposition 1, if any v ∈ V(X) is a solution to (DPD), in which case we denote this particular 
v as V , then it equals of V ∗. As V ∗ is uniquely defined and a solution to (DPD), V ∗ is the unique 
solution to (DPD) in V(X), and hence the unique fixed point of T on V(X). 
Proposition 4. Suppose all of the conditions in Proposition 3 hold. Then, for any v ∈ V(X), the 
sequence {T nv} converges to V ∗.
Proof. The complete proof is relegated to the separate appendix, and we provide a sketch here. In 
the separate appendix, we show that {T nv} is Cauchy, and hence {T nv} converges. The intuition 
behind {T nv} being Cauchy is briefly explained as follows. For an arbitrary v ∈ V(X), T v is a 
minimization problem with one F(x, x′). To get T 2v, one replaces v with T v, and hence T 2v
becomes a problem of 1 +q min operators with q minimization problems embedded in an overall 
one. When repeating this process to get T nv, there are numerous terms similar to F(x, x′) with 
x, x′ properly replaced by the sequence notation. Even though the problem implied by T nv is 
not the same as (SPV ), the difference between them diminishes as n gets large. This is mainly 
because v appears only at the very end of the (expanded) T nv problem, and when examining 
|T n+1v − T nv|, it is easy to verify that the difference is a matter of two multi-furcations at the 
end, i.e., for i = n, n + 1. The fact that any v ∈ V(X) satisfies (7) with v in place of V implies 
that the difference eventually disappears as n goes to infinity.
Although T nv(x) as a hierarchy of minimization problems is different from the partial sum 
version of (SPV ), it is shown in the separate appendix that for all x ∈ X,
T nv(x) ≤ min
x∈Π(x)
[
un−1(x)+
Kn∑
k=1
T v(xn,k)
]
. (10)
Since T v ∈ V(X) so that (7) holds with T v in place of V , take n to infinity and we have
lim
n→∞T
nv(x) ≤ min
x∈Π(x) u(x) = V
∗(x).
Now, denote the optimal sequence that solves this T nv(x) problem as {x˜i}n+1i=1 . The existence of 
such a sequence is guaranteed by Proposition 3 because each of the minimization problems in the 
expanded problem implied by T nv(x) has a minimizer. Obviously, x˜ ≡ {x˜i}∞i=1 ∈ Π(x1). Taking 
n to infinity and by definition of V ∗,
lim
n→∞T
nv(x) = lim
n→∞
{
un−1(x˜)+
Kn∑
k=1
T v(x˜n,k)
}
= u(x˜) ≥ V ∗(x). (11)
The result that limn→∞ T nv(x) = V ∗(x) follows from (10) and (11). 
3.3. Characterization in the city hierarchy problem
To see how the city hierarchy problem is a special case of (SPV) and (DPD), let q = 2 and X =
[0, 1] × [0, z1] ⊆ R2. Let F(x, y) = A(, z) − A(, z′), where x = (, z) and Γ is given by (2)
such that y ={(α, z′), ((1 −α), z′)}, where α ∈ (0, 1), and z′ ∈ [0, z]. For the sequence notation, 
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x1 = (1, z1), and for i ≥ 2, xi,j = {xi,2j−1, xi,2j } = {(i,2j−1, zi,j ), (i,2j , zi,j )}, for j =
1, 2, ..., qi−2. Hence, for i ≥ 2, F(xi,2j−1, xi+1,2j−1) = A(i,2j−1, zi,j ) −A(i,2j−1, zi+1,2j−1), 
and F(xi,2j , xi+1,2j ) = A(i,2j , zi,j ) − A(i,2j , zi+1,2j ). One obtains (SPD) and (DPD) by sub-
stituting all of these into (SPV) and (DPD).
In this subsection, we explain how the conditions of Propositions 1 to 4 hold. We start with 
the principle of optimality, i.e., Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. For any two positive real numbers 1 and z1, let X = [0, 1] ×[0, z1], and let D(X)
denote the set of all real-valued continuous functions d : X →R+ such that
0 ≤ d(, z) ≤ A(, z). (12)
Then, the following hold.
(i) D∗ is the unique solution to (DPD) in D(X).
(ii) A feasible sequence (∗, z∗) ∈ Π(1, z1) attains the infimum in (SPD) if and only if it satisfies 
(DPD) recursively, i.e.,
D∗
(
∗i,k, z∗i,k
)= A(∗i,k, z∗i,k)−A(∗i,k, z∗i+1,k)+D∗(∗i+1,2k−1, z∗i+1,k)
+D∗(∗i+1,2k, z∗i+1,k).
Proof. First note that as 1 and z1 are positive, the constraint Γ given by (2) is nonempty. Note 
that A2 holds as a result of Lemmas 1 and 2. Then, for d ∈ D(X) and any feasible sequence 
(, z) ∈ Π(, z),
0 ≤
Kn∑
k=1
[
d(n+1,2k−1, zn+1,k)+ d(n+1,2k, zn+1,k)
]
≤
Kn∑
k=1
[
A(n+1,2k−1, zn+1,k)+A(n+1,2k, zn+1,k)
]
,
of which the right-hand side goes to 0 as n goes to infinity because A(0) = 0. Hence, if any D is 
a solution to (DPD) and D ∈D(X), then
lim
n→∞
Kn∑
k=1
[
D(n+1,2k−1, zn+1,k)+D(n+1,2k, zn+1,k)
]= 0, (13)
which is the version of (7) in the city hierarchy problem. Because there are positive savings from 
building smaller cities, D∗(1, z1) ∈ [0, A(1, z1)], and hence by part (i) of Proposition 1, D∗
is a solution to (DPD) in D(X). According to (13) and part (ii) of Proposition 1, any solution 
D to (DPD) in D(X) equals D∗. Hence, D∗ is the unique solution to (DPD) in D(X). As the 
conditions needed for Proposition 2 are the same, the second result follows. 
To show that Propositions 3 and 4 hold in the city hierarchy problem, we need the following 
lemma.
Lemma 3. Let D(X) be given by Corollary 1. Let T : D(X) → D(X) be given by, for each 
d ∈D(X),
T d(, z) ≡ inf
α∈(0,1),z′∈[0,z]
A(, z)−A(, z′)+ d(α, z′)+ d((1 − α), z′). (14)
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Then,
(i) 0 ≤ T d(, z) ≤ A(, z).
(ii) Given (, z) ∈ X, there exists an 	 > 0 such that every optimal choice of α ∈ [	, 1 − 	] for 
all d . That is, the optimal choice of α cannot be arbitrarily close to 0 or 1.
Proof. That T d ≥ 0 is trivial. Use (12) to write
T d(, z) ≤ inf
α∈(0,1),z′∈[0,z]
A(, z)−A(, z′)+A(α, z′)+A((1 − α), z′)
= inf
α∈(0,1),z′∈[0,z]
A(, z)+Φ(z′)− z′t2
2
α(1 − α). (15)
By (4),
Φ
(
z′
)− z′t2
2
α(1 − α) =
z′∫
0
[
φ(y)− t
2
2
α(1 − α)
]
dy < 0.
Hence, T d satisfies (12). The proof of part (ii) is relegated to the separate appendix. The intuition 
is that when α is arbitrarily close to either 0 or 1, z′ tends to 0, and the city hierarchy so built 
is close to nonexistent. Therefore, such α cannot be optimal because it must fare worse than 
α = 1/2, which guarantees positive savings. 
The following corollary shows how Propositions 3 and 4 hold in the city hierarchy problem.
Corollary 2. Let D(X) and T be given by Corollary 1 and Lemma 3. Then,
(i) T d is continuous. Hence, T is a self-mapping on D(X).
(ii) The minimum is attained; so inf in the definition of T in (14) can be replaced with min. 
Moreover, the set of minimizers is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on X.
(iii) D∗ is the unique solution to (DPD) in D(X) and hence the unique fixed point of the mapping 
T on D(X).
(iv) For any d ∈D(X), the sequence {T nd} converges to D∗.
Proof. The four points (i)–(iv) are the results in Propositions 3 and 4. We must show that A1, A2, 
and A3 hold, and that there exists an M that satisfies the condition described in Proposition 3. 
First, A2 holds as a result of Lemmas 1 and 2. Recall that for i ≥ 2, F(xi,2j−1, xi+1,2j−1) =
A(i,2j−1, zi,j ) −A(i,2j−1, zi+1,2j−1), and F(xi,2j , xi+1,2j ) = A(i,2j , zi,j ) −A(i,2j , zi+1,2j ). 
Hence, A3 holds. Lemma 3 shows that although the constraint Γ given by (2) is not compact 
because α ∈ (0, 1), the effective constraint set is compact, and hence A1 holds. It also shows that 
we can simply set M = A, which is continuous and strictly increasing with A(0) = 0. 
We have written Matlab programs implementing this iterative method of finding a solution 
with any φ and/or any initial guess. In particular, because we have the analytical solution when 
φ is a power function (see the next subsection), we compare the numerical solution with the 
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analytical one in this case. The approximation works well, and the convergence is achieved 
quickly.12 These programs are available to interested readers upon request.
3.4. Central place property
The beauty of Corollary 2 is that it allows the solution to be found numerically for any arbi-
trary φ that satisfies the basic assumptions. Nevertheless, there is an interesting and empirically 
relevant case of φ in which we can obtain the solution analytically. It turns out that the central 
place property holds in this case.
Suppose that the setup cost is a power function: φ(z) = azb , for a > 0 and b > 0. Under 
this functional form, Φ(z) = a
b+1z
b+1
. The power function assumption of φ, in fact, means that 
the distribution of setup costs across goods is also a power function. Let Y denote the random 
variable of setup cost for a good. Then, for y ∈ [0, φ(z1)],
Pr[Y ≤ y] = φ
−1(y)
z1
= 1
z1
(
y
a
) 1
b
.
As shown in Hsu’s [16] equilibrium model of central place hierarchy, this distribution of setup 
cost is a prototype of a class of distributions that leads to a power law distribution of city size.13
This class encompasses several well-known, commonly used distributions. See Hsu [16] for more 
details.
Recall that it is possible that the optimal z2 = z1 if 1 is too large. Note from (4) that savings 
s1(1, α) is bounded by s1(1, 1/2) = t21/8. Define ¯(z) by the solution of  in the following 
equation
t2
8
= φ(z). (16)
Then, for any 1 < ¯(z1), optimal z2 < z1, and thus the two z1-cities with distance 1 are neigh-
boring. For the rest of the analyses in this paper, we impose the condition that 1 < ¯(z1).
Proposition 5. Suppose that 1 < ¯(z1), where ¯(z) is defined as the solution to (16). Suppose 
that the setup cost function φ(y) = azb , for positive constants a and b. Then, the central place 
property holds.
Proof. For ease of presentation, let a = 1. A general a > 0 does not change the result. From (4),
z′ =
(
t2
2
α(1 − α)
) 1
b =
(
t
2
α(1 − α)
) 1
b

2
b ≡ κ(α) 2b . (17)
12 For the power φ case, depending on the level of tolerance, T nc converges in about 10 to 15 iterations, and, when 
plotted, the limit function is visually indistinguishable from the true analytical C∗ given by (21) except near the boundary 
of the domain.
13 As we mention in footnote 6, there are deviations from the power law when smaller cities and towns are included. 
For example, Eeckhout [9] shows that lognormal distribution fits better than the power law in this case. In fact, it can be 
verified by following the procedure in Hsu [16] that when φ(0) > 0, the Zipf’s plot of city size (log of rank vs. log of size) 
is concave, which would be the case under log-normal distribution. The larger the value of φ(0), the larger the concavity. 
The reason for such concavity is that when there are finite layers, the entire hierarchy is less of a fractal structure and 
deviation from the power law is observed.
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Eq. (17) implicitly assumes that z′ < z. Recall that Lemma 2 rules out zi+1,2k−1 = zi,k or 
zi+1,2k−1 = zi,k as an optimal solution, and hence (17) is necessarily true for all optimal choices 
of zi,k , except possibly for i = 2. However, the constraint 1 < ¯(z1) ensures that optimal z2 < z1.
Recall from (5) that there is a sequence α = {αi,k} associated with any sequence (, z) ∈
Π(1, z1). The fact that the optimal solution of z′ is separable in  and α implies that, except 
for z1, we can write zi,k = 2/b1 hi,k(α) and i,k = 1gi,k(α), for some functions hi,k and gi,k . 
Thus, both A(i,2k−1, zi,k) −A(i,2k−1, zi+1,2k−1) and A(i,2k, zi,k) −A(i,2k, zi+1,2k) are mul-
tiplicatively separable in 2(b+1)/b1 and some functions of α. Thus, for some function H , (SP) can 
be rewritten as
C∗(1, z1) = z
b+1
1
(b + 1)1 +
z1t1
4
+ 
b+2
b
1 H
(
α∗
)
.
By Corollaries 1 and 2, an optimal α∗ exists, and as such, H(α∗) is well-defined. Note that 
H(α∗) < 0, and (b+2)/b1 |H(α∗)| is the per capita savings from building the optimal city hier-
archy. Given the equivalence between (SP) and (DP), observe that the negative of per capita 
savings from having an optimal city hierarchy in an interval of  is given by
S˜(, z) ≡ C(, z)− A(, z)

= C(, z)− z
b+1
(b + 1) −
zt
4
=  b+2b H (α∗). (18)
This says that the S˜ function is homogenous of degree (b+ 2)/b in  and independent of z. With 
a little abuse of notation, we write S˜() = S˜(, z). Given (17) and (18), (DP) can be rewritten as
S˜() = min
z′∈(0,z),α∈(0,1)
A(α, z′)+A((1 − α), z′)−A(, z′)

+ [α 2(b+1)b + (1 − α) 2(b+1)b ]S˜(). (19)
Thus,
S˜() = −b
b + 1
(
t
2
) b+1
b

b+2
b max
α∈(0,1)
[α(1 − α)] b+1b
1 − α 2(b+1)b − (1 − α) 2(b+1)b
. (20)
We show in the separate appendix that the unique solution to the maximization problem in (20)
is α = 1/2. 
Observe that the optimal sequence α∗ does not depend on 1. The recursive nature implies 
that for all i, k, the optimal sequence in the interval of i,k, i.e., {αi′,k}i′≥i , does not depend on 
the magnitude of i,k . Thus, under this power function distribution of setup costs, the optimal 
city hierarchy in any interval of i,k resembles that of the entire one in 1. As Hsu [16] shows 
that this scale-free property gives the city hierarchy a fractal structure; specifically, the structure 
of the smaller part of the hierarchy resembles that of the larger.
With optimal α = 1/2, using (18) and (20), we obtain the cost function
C(, z) = z
b+1
(b + 1) +
zt
4
− b
b + 1
1
2
3(b+1)
b − 2 2b+1b
t
b+1
b 
b+2
b . (21)
One can verify Proposition 5 by applying the guess-and-verify technique to (DP). That is, if 
one plugs the functional form of C given by (21) into the right-hand side of (DP) and solves 
the minimization problem, one will find that the unique minimizer is α = 1/2. Then, the value 
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of the right-hand side, given (, z), will be exactly (21), which verifies that the C given by 
(21) satisfies the functional equation. Since C(, z) <A(, z), Corollary 1 and the equivalence 
between (DPD) and (DP) imply that the C given by (21) is C∗.
The tractability under the power function φ allows us to see the intuition behind α = 1/2. 
Observe that there are two conflicting forces in choosing α. If one simply builds a z′-city without 
further building cities smaller than z′, then the optimal choice is α = 1/2. This is obvious upon 
observing (3) and noting that the savings in transport costs reaches its maximum when α = 1/2. 
However, Lemma 1 also says that we must build smaller cities in each of the two intervals split 
by the z′-city. To maximize the total savings in the two intervals from building these smaller 
cities, it is optimal to split the intervals unevenly, i.e., to choose an α relatively close to 0 or 1. 
This is characterized in Eq. (19) in the term [α 2(b+1)b + (1 −α) 2(b+1)b ]S˜(). Obviously, the bracket 
term reaches its maximum at 0 or 1. This means that the benefit of having one large interval so 
that more savings can be attained outweighs the loss of having a smaller one. The two conflicting 
forces are nicely summarized in (20), the first in the numerator and the second in the denomi-
nator. Note that the two conflicting forces operate on different levels of y ∈ [0, z′], and that how 
φ changes across y is critical. The first force, by having α closer to 1/2, increases z′ and saves 
on these higher levels of goods, whereas the second force is concerned with savings on goods 
relatively close to 0. Imagine two φ functions which take the same value at z with one φ dimin-
ishing faster than the other when y moves down from z. For the φ function that φ(y) diminishes 
quickly when y goes down, like the power function, the first force dominates the second because 
there are more savings from the higher level goods as the setup costs for these goods are lower 
than the case in which φ(y) diminishes slowly. This intuition is consistent with the example in 
Section 2.4 where α 	= 1/2. In that example, the smooth approximation of a non-smooth φ means 
that φ does not diminish very quickly for y ∈ [0, e] until it gets very close to 0. In other words, 
if φ diminishes at a fast enough rate, the first force dominates and α = 1/2 becomes the optimal 
outcome.
3.5. Optimal distance between largest cities
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal distance between largest cities conditional on 
the central place property. We use the superscript ∗ to denote an optimal solution. The optimal 
distance between two neighboring z1-cities is the social planner’s first stage problem:
∗1 = arg min
1∈(0,¯(z1))
C∗(1, z1). (22)
When 1 increases to ¯(z1), z∗2 = z1, and the distance between two neighboring z1-cities drops 
to ¯(z1)/2. Hence, to look for the optimal distance between two neighboring z1-cities, we need 
only focus on 1 ∈ (0, ¯(z1)). The next proposition guarantees the existence of ∗1 and provides a 
sharper lower bound for ∗1, which is useful for the welfare analysis conducted in Section 4.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the central place property holds in an optimal solution. Then, there 
exists an ∗1 ∈ (0, ¯(z1)) that solves (22). That is, an optimal distance between two neighboring 
z1-cities exists. Moreover, ∗1 ∈ [¯(z1)/2, ¯(z1)).
Proof. See the separate appendix. 
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Fig. 4. How cost C depends on the distance 1 between largest cities.
The intuition is that (22) can be viewed as a minimization of a continuous function C∗
on a compact set [δ, ¯(z1)] for some small δ > 0. It is intuitive that for any given z1, 
lim1→0 C∗(1, z1) = ∞ because the per capita setup cost explodes when 1 → 0, and hence 
(0, δ) for some δ are excluded as possible minimizers. To search for optimal 1, we can include 
¯(z1) as candidate because if it attains the minimum, then we set ∗1 = ¯(z1)/2. To see why 
∗1 ≥ ¯(z1)/2, suppose that ∗1 < ¯(z1)/2, i.e., the optimal distance between the two largest cities 
is less than half the distance that entails z∗2 = z1. Then, at 1 = 2∗1, it is optimal to set z∗2 = z1 so 
that the effective distance between two neighboring z1-cities is exactly ∗1, which by definition 
minimizes the per capita cost C∗. However, this contradicts the fact that the optimal z∗2 at 1 must 
be less than z1 since 1 = 2∗1 < ¯(z1).
In general, ∗1 need not be unique, although the uniqueness of ∗1 in the case of a power 
function φ can be verified by studying the shape of C given in (21). For any optimal solution ∗1, 
it is optimal to let all z1-cities be evenly spaced with a distance of ∗1, although z1-cities do not 
have to be evenly spaced when there are multiple solutions to (22). Fig. 4 shows how C(1, z1)
depends on 1 < ¯(z1) when φ is a power function.
Next, we utilize an envelope argument to illustrate the economics behind the determination 
of ∗1. Of course, the underlying economics do not depend on the differentiability of C∗ in 1, 
but it is convenient to proceed assuming such differentiability.14 Observe that from (DP),
∂C(, z)
∂
= t (z − z
′∗)
4
− Φ(z)−Φ(z
′∗)
2
,
where z′∗ is the optimal size of the immediate sub-city, given (, z). The optimal choice of 1
satisfies the necessary condition: ∂C(1, z1)/∂1 = 0. Hence,
t (z1 − z∗2)∗1
4
= Φ(z1)−Φ(z
∗
2)
∗1
.
14 The differentiability of C∗ in z1 is guaranteed if 1 < ¯(z1) so that optimal z2 < z1. However, the differentiability 
of C∗ in 1 is not obvious. For example, Lucas and Stokey [20] prove the differentiability of a value function by the 
concavity of the function. Here, such an argument does not work since C∗ is not necessarily convex (we are looking at a 
minimization problem, whereas a maximization problem is examined in Lucas and Stokey). As Fig. 4 shows, C∗ in 1
is neither convex nor concave.
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The above equation means that the choice of ∗1 is such that the per capita transport cost for the 
goods (z∗2, z1] equals the per capita setup costs for this range of goods. As the per capita trans-
port/setup cost increases/decreases in 1 with z∗2 fixed at an optimal level, the scale economies 
of having a larger 1 to share the setup costs, at ∗1, should be exactly offset by the additional 
transport costs.
4. Welfare analysis and extension to the plane
The environment in Hsu’s [16] model is essentially the same as that in this paper. Thus, we 
can compare the equilibrium allocation in his model with our optimal solution. In this section, 
we first introduce Hsu’s equilibrium setting and the main result. Then, we determine whether an 
optimal solution can be decentralized, and, if there is a discrepancy between an equilibrium and 
the optimal allocation, what the pattern of deviation is in terms of entry. Note that as there are 
infinitely many production sites for each good in both models, we measure entry for each good 
as the number of production sites per unit distance. Hence, the smaller the distance between 
production sites, the larger the entry. In this section, we also briefly discuss how Lemmas 1 and 2
apply to a two dimensional space.
4.1. Hierarchy equilibrium in Hsu [16]
The environment in Hsu [16] is the same as that in Section 2.1, except that the hierarchy 
property is not imposed. As an equilibrium model, Hsu [16] must specify the interactions of 
agents through which an equilibrium arises. The related details are as follows.
4.1.1. Firm entry and one-good equilibrium
For each good there is an infinite pool of potential firms. The firms and farmers play the 
following two-stage game (Lederer and Hurter [18]).
1. Entry and location stage
The potential firms simultaneously decide whether to enter. Upon entering, each entrant 
chooses a location and pays the setup cost for the good it produces. Assume the tie-breaking 
rule: if a potential firm sees a zero-profit opportunity, then it enters.
2. Price competition stage
The firms deliver goods to the farmers. Given its own and other firms’ locations, each firm 
sets a delivered price schedule over the real line. For each good, each location on the real 
line is a market in which the firms engage in Bertrand competition. Each farmer decides the 
specific firm from which to buy each good.
Consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of any particular good z. Consider 
two neighboring firms at a distance of . Denote the firm on the left-hand side as A and that 
on the right-hand side as B . The marginal costs of delivering the good to a consumer who is x
distance from A are thus MCA = γ + tx and MCB = γ + t ( − x). Bertrand competition at each 
x results in the firm with the lower marginal cost grabbing the market and charging the price of its 
opponent’s marginal cost. Without loss of generality, let A be located at 0. Thus, the equilibrium 
prices on [0, ] can be written as
p(x) =
{
γ + t (− x) x ∈ [0, 2 ],
γ + tx x ∈ [ 2 , ].
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The gross profit for firm A from the market area on its right-hand side and that for B from 
that on its left-hand side are both t2/4. Consider any entrant’s strategy in the first stage. Let this 
entrant be named C. If C were to enter into the interval between A and B, then it is straightforward 
that C’s profit-maximizing location will be exactly in the middle of the two, given A and B’s 
locations. Any deviation from the middle will strictly decrease C’s profit, and C will enter if and 
only if this maximal profit is nonnegative. Therefore, firms must be an equal distance apart, and 
the gross profit of any firm with a market area of  is t2/2. Now, for any z, define (z) as the 
solution to the zero-profit condition t[(z)]2/2 = φ(z). Thus, (z) = √2φ(z)/t . The foregoing 
derivation of an SPNE for an arbitrary good implies that there is a continuum of equilibria in 
which one firm is located at every point in {x + n}∞n=−∞, where  ∈ [(z), 2(z)) and x ∈
[0, (z)). The continuum of equilibria exists because any distance  in the interval [(z), 2(z))
is an equilibrium distance;  ≥ (z) implies that all firms earn a nonnegative profit (no exit), 
whereas /2 < (z) implies that any new entrant between any two existing firms must earn a 
negative profit (no entry).
4.1.2. Hierarchy equilibrium and central place property
An equilibrium is a collection of firm locations, delivered price schedules, and farmers’ con-
sumption choices such that the allocation for each good is an SPNE. A hierarchy equilibrium
is an equilibrium in which, at any production location, the set of goods produced takes the 
form [0, z] for some z ∈ (0, z1]. In a hierarchy equilibrium, there exists a decreasing sequence 
z1 > z2 > ... > zi > ... such that any production location is zi-city for some zi . Obviously, a hi-
erarchy equilibrium satisfies the central place property if the market area of the firms producing 
(zi+1, zi] is half that of the firms producing (zi, zi−1].
Proposition 1 in Hsu [16] states that some equilibria have the hierarchy property and that all 
such hierarchy equilibria satisfy the central place property. Hence, every hierarchy equilibrium 
is a central place hierarchy characterized as follows. Fix an x ∈ R and set the grid for (zi+1, zi]
as {x + ni}∞n=−∞, where 1 ∈ [(z1), 2(z1)), i = 1/2i−1, and the cutoff zi is given by the 
zero-profit condition
φ(zi) = t
2
i
2
for all i ≥ 2. (23)
Without loss of generality, let x = 0. Then, the location configuration so constructed, which 
obviously satisfies both the hierarchy and the central place property, is precisely that given in 
Fig. 1, except that only four layers are depicted in the figure.
The characterization above indicates that there is a continuum of central place hierarchy equi-
libria, each of which is characterized by an 1 ∈ [(z1), 2(z1)). Note that, depending on φ, an 
optimal hierarchy may or may not have the central place property, as shown by Proposition 5 and 
the example in Section 2.4. In contrast, if an overall equilibrium is a hierarchy, it will have the 
central place property, and such equilibria exist for any φ.
4.2. Decentralization?
In this and the next subsection, we compare hierarchy equilibria, i.e., those equilibria that 
are hierarchies (and hence have the central place property by Proposition 1 of Hsu [16]), with 
optimal hierarchies that satisfy the central place property. As the superscript ∗ denotes an opti-
mal allocation, we use the superscript e to denote the allocation in a hierarchy equilibrium. For 
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∗1 ∈ (0, ¯(z1)), z∗2 < z1. Since α = 1/2, ∗i,k is the same across k, and we denote ∗i ≡ ∗i,k for all 
i ≥ 2. Obviously, ∗i = ∗1/2i−1. Using (4) recursively, for i ≥ 2,
φ
(
z∗i
)= t (∗i−1)2
8
= t (
∗
i )
2
2
. (24)
By comparing (23) and (24), we see that the {z∗i } and {zei } sequences would be identical 
if and only if ∗1 = e1.15 Hence, the optimal allocation can be decentralized if and only if 
∗1 ∈ [(z1), 2(z1)); that is, the optimal distance between two neighboring z1-cities is within 
the continuum of the distance between two neighboring z1-cities in a hierarchy equilibrium.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the central place property holds in an optimal solution. Then, ∗1 ∈[(z1), 2(z1)). That is, the optimal solution can be decentralized.
Proof. Observe that by combining (16), (22), and (23), we have
t (∗1)2
8
<
t¯(z1)2
8
= φ(z1) = t(z1)
2
2
,
which implies that ¯(z1) = 2(z1). The results follow from Proposition 6. 
4.3. Entry comparison
As there is a continuum of hierarchy equilibria, some may be suboptimal. For example, with a 
power function φ, it can be verified that ∗1 is unique (see Fig. 4), and thus there must be subopti-
mal hierarchy equilibria. Here, we compare the entry for goods between a hierarchy-equilibrium 
allocation and an optimal one. In a spatial competition model, Salop [28], using a one-good 
model, shows that there is always greater equilibrium entry than what is optimal. We show that 
whenever e1 	= ∗1, the directions of deviation for different goods are different, in contrast with 
Salop’s result. More specifically, the directions of deviation alternate across sets of goods. That 
is, the whole range of goods can be partitioned into sets such that the first set has an equilibrium 
entry that is less (more) than that in the optimal solution, the second set has one that is more 
(less), the third set less (more), and so on. Fig. 5 illustrates such a case where e1 > ∗1. The words 
“more/less” in the figure mean that the equilibrium entry is more/less than the optimal one.
Proposition 7. With the central place property, the following hold:
1. If e1 = ∗1 , then entry for each good is identical in both the equilibrium and the optimal 
solution.
15 To see the intuition for why the two sequences are identical, recall that the gross profit of a firm with market area 
 is t2/2. The gross profit of an entrant that enters at the middle of a market area of  is thus t2/8, which is exactly 
the savings in transport costs created by the entrant locating in the middle. Thus, the zero-profit condition (23) is the 
same as (24). Note that under Bertrand competition, gross profits are created from the difference between two competing 
firms’ delivery costs. If an entrant were not to enter, then all the potential gross profits of an entrant would be part of the 
transport costs incurred by some incumbents. In other words, the benefits to consumers brought by an entrant, i.e., the 
savings in transport costs, equal the entrant’s own benefits.
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Fig. 5. An equilibrium allocation can alternately have greater or smaller entry than the optimal allocation. Depicted is the 
case of e1 > 
∗
1.
2. If e1 > ∗1 , then
(a) z∗i+1 < zei+1 ≤ z∗i for all i ≥ 1. The [0, z1] continuum can be partitioned into sets of the form (zei+1, z∗i ] and (z∗i+1, zei+1], for all i ∈N.
(b) For all y ∈ (z∗i+1, zei+1], equilibrium entry is weakly more than the optimal one.
(c) For all y ∈ (zei+1, z∗i ], equilibrium entry is less than the optimal one.
3. If e1 < ∗1 , then the result in (b) holds with the superscripts of ∗ and e exchanged.
Proof. See the separate appendix. 
4.4. Extension to the plane
Suppose that the geographic space is the infinite plane, instead of the real line. One difficulty 
with two-dimensional space is that for a polygon formed by a set of neighboring cities at the 
vertices, the market area of smaller cities inside the polygon may actually extend outside the 
polygon, and some cities outside the polygon can have their market areas inside it. It is thus 
unclear how the sequence and dynamic programming problems should be formulated. Even when 
they are formulated, it is conceivably difficult to generalize Corollary 2 because while there is just 
a one-parameter family of intervals in one-dimensional space, there is an intractible infinitude of 
two-dimensional regions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that Lemmas 1 and 2 still hold 
on the plane.16
Lemma 1′. It is never optimal to have an area without any city in it. That is, cities are dense.
Proof. Suppose the contrary is true. That is, suppose that there is a polygon formed by cities 
that produce at least up to z ∈ (0, z1] at the vertices, and that there is no city inside the polygon. 
Consider having a z′-city inside the polygon with z′ ∈ (0, z]. Given the location of the z′-city, the 
savings in transport costs for each good are fixed at some number s > 0, and the total savings for 
all goods [0, z′] equals sz′. Then, for each z′ such that φ(z′) ≤ s, the setup cost of the z′-city is 
16 It is also interesting to note that if the plane is divided according to Christaller [4] as in Fig. 6, then with optimal z∗
i
given by φ(z∗
i
) equaling the savings in transport costs for the good z∗
i
, it is a straightforward exercise to follow Hsu [16]
to verify that the city size distribution follows the power law. In fact, the power law result also holds for regular square 
and triangular regions.
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Fig. 6. Central place hierarchy on the plane (Christaller [4]).
Φ(z′) ≤ sz′. Because φ is strictly increasing and continuous with φ(0) = 0, such z′ must exist, 
and hence there must be positive net savings. Thus, a polygon without any smaller cities in it is 
never optimal. 
Lemma 2′. It is never optimal to have two cities of the same size z′ with a point closer to both of 
them than to any other city with z≥ z′, where z ≤ z1.
Proof. Observe that Lemma 2 holds precisely because the savings in transport costs of increasing 
z′ at two z′-cities simultaneously are less than the sum of the savings of increasing z′ at each 
z′-city separately. This is because there is some point (consumer) in the interval that benefits 
from increasing z′ at either city because it is closer to both of the z′-cities than it is to any of the 
cities producing at least z ≥ z′. The same logic applies to two-dimensional space here. 
5. Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of optimal city hierarchy. The model formalizes central place 
theory via an efficiency rationale. It takes the hierarchy property as given and provides the con-
ditions under which the central place property is optimal. In this sense, this paper complements 
Quinzii and Thisse [25], who model the hierarchy property. It remains to be seen whether the 
optimality of both properties can be obtained in one concise model.
As mentioned, as long as there are immobile consumers, regardless of their fraction in the 
economy, spreading across the entire geographic space, there exists the need for cities and towns 
to spread out to serve these consumers. From this perspective, central place theory is still very rel-
evant to the modern-day economy, even though it may be true that as the economy becomes more 
industrialized, the location patterns may become more biased compared with the “ideal” central 
place pattern. The uniform distribution of consumers is, of course, a rough approximation of real 
spatial distribution. Nevertheless, it is useful to clarify in theory what happens under the uniform 
distribution to take advantage of its tractability. One take-home message is that even under uni-
form distribution, the optimal locational pattern does not necessarily conform to the central place 
pattern. As Propositions 3 and 4 can in principle be applied in the more general environments of 
spatial problems, simulations of what would happen under a more realistic distribution may be a 
desirable direction for future research.
We conclude by summarizing two methodological messages. First, there are benefits 
to using dynamic programming to study spatial problems, as demonstrated by Lucas and 
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Rossi-Hansberg [19] on internal city structure and this paper on city hierarchy. Second, the 
techniques developed in this paper may also be useful for various hierarchical problems (not 
limited to spatial problems), as Propositions 1 to 4 are all applicable in a general setting with 
recursive divisions.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
The separate appendix to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.
2014.09.018.
References
[1] M.J. Beckmann, City hierarchies and the distribution of city size, Econ. Devel. Cult. Change 6 (3) (1958) 243–248.
[2] M.J. Beckmann, City size distribution in a central place hierarchy: an alternative approach, J. Reg. Sci. 10 (1) (1970) 
25–33.
[3] M. Berliant, Central place theory, dictionary entry, in: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
[4] W. Christaller, Central Places in Southern Germany, translated by Carlisle W. Baskin (1966), Prentice-Hall, Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ, 1933.
[5] J.-C. Córdoba, On the distribution of city sizes, J. Urban Econ. 63 (2008) 177–197.
[6] G. Duranton, Some foundations for Zipf’s law: product proliferation and local spillovers, Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 
36 (4) (2006) 543–563.
[7] G. Duranton, Urban evolutions: the fast, the slow, and the still, Amer. Econ. Rev. 97 (1) (2007) 197–221.
[8] B.C. Eaton, R.G. Lipsey, An economic theory of central places, Econ. J. 92 (365) (1982) 56–72.
[9] J. Eeckhout, Gibrat’s law for (all) cities, Amer. Econ. Rev. 94 (5) (2004) 1429–1451.
[10] M. Fujita, P. Krugman, T. Mori, On the evolution of hierarchical urban systems, Europ. Econ. Rev. 43 (1999) 
209–251.
[11] M. Fujita, P. Krugman, A.J. Venables, The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade, The MIT 
Press, 1999.
[12] X. Gabaix, Zipf’s law for cities: an explanation, Quart. J. Econ. 114 (3) (1999) 739–767.
[13] J.V. Henderson, The types and size of cities, Amer. Econ. Rev. 64 (1974) 640–656.
[14] L. Garicano, Hierarchies and the organization of knowledge in production, J. Polit. Economy 108 (5) (2000) 
874–904.
[15] L. Garicano, E. Rossi-Hansberg, Organization and inequality in a knowledge economy, Quart. J. Econ. 121 (4) 
(2006) 1383–1435.
[16] W.-T. Hsu, Central place theory and city size distribution, Econ. J. 122 (2012) 903–932.
[17] L.J. King, Central Place Theory, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1984.
[18] P.J. Lederer, A.P. Hurter Jr., Competition of firms: discriminatory pricing and location, Econometrica 54 (3) (1986) 
623–640.
[19] R.E. Lucas Jr., E. Rossi-Hansberg, On the internal structure of cities, Econometrica 70 (4) (2002) 1445–1476.
[20] R.E. Lucas Jr., N. Stokey, E. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1989.
[21] J.A. Mirrlees, The optimum town, Swedish J. Econ. 74 (1) (1972) 114–135.
[22] T. Mori, K. Nishikimi, T.E. Smith, The number-average size rule: a new empirical relationship between industrial 
location and city size, J. Reg. Sci. 48 (2008) 165–211.
[23] T. Mori, T.E. Smith, An industrial agglomeration approach to central place and city size regularities, J. Reg. Sci. 
51 (4) (2011) 694–731.
[24] Y. Qian, Incentives and loss of control in an optimal hierarchy, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 (3) (1994) 527–544.
[25] M. Quinzii, J.-F. Thisse, On the optimality of central places, Econometrica 58 (5) (1990) 1101–1119.
[26] E. Rossi-Hansberg, M.L.J. Wright, Urban structure and growth, Rev. Econ. Stud. 74 (2) (2007) 597–624.
[27] H. Rozenfeld, D. Rybski, X. Gabaix, H. Makse, The area and population of cities: new insights from a different 
perspective on cities, Amer. Econ. Rev. 101 (5) (2011) 2205–2225.
[28] S.C. Salop, Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell J. Econ. 10 (1) (1979) 141–156.
W.-T. Hsu et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) 245–273 273
[29] H. Simon, On a class of skew distribution functions, Biometrika 44 (1955) 425–440, reprinted in: Models of Man: 
Social and Rational. Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting, Wiley and Sons, New 
York, 1957.
[30] T. Tabuchi, J.-F. Thisse, Regional specialization, urban hierarchy, and commuting costs, Int. Econ. Rev. 47 (4) 
(2006) 1295–1317.
[31] T. Tabuchi, J.-F. Thisse, A new economic geography model of central places, J. Urban Econ. 69 (2011) 240–252.
